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Abstract: This article investigates patterns of personal pronoun usage in four texts 
written by women about women’s rights during the 1790s: Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), Mary 
Hays’ An Appeal to the Men of Great Britain (1798), Mary Robinson’s 
Letter to the Women of England (1799) and Mary Anne Radcliffe’s The 
Female Advocate (1799).  I begin by showing that at the time these texts 
were written there was a widespread assumption that both writers and 
readers of political pamphlets were, by default, male.  As such, I argue, 
writing to women as a woman was distinctly problematic, not least 
because these default assumptions meant that ever apparently gender-
neutral pronouns such as I, we and you were in fact covertly gendered.  I 
use the textual analysis programme Wordsmith to identify the personal 
pronouns in my four texts, and discuss my results both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  I find that while one of my texts does little to disturb 
gender expectations through its deployment of personal pronouns, the 
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other three all use personal pronouns that disrupt eighteenth century 
expectations about default male authorship and readership. 
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1. Introduction 
 Britain in the 1790s saw the publication of a number of pamphlets championing the 
rights of women.  The main catalyst for this flurry of proto-feminist activity was the 
French Revolution, which provoked a wide-ranging debate in Britain about ‘the rights of 
man’.  Participants in the debate uniformly understood ‘man’ in this context to be 
specifically male rather than generically human, and the rights of woman generally went 
unconsidered.
1
  Nevertheless, some writers did begin to question where women stood in 
the equation.  Most notably, Mary Wollstonecraft contributed to the French Revolution 
debate with A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790), which was a direct response to 
Edmund Burke’s inflammatory Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).  Like 
other contributors to the debate, Wollstonecraft assumed that the ‘rights of man’ 
referred to male rights only, although she also addressed the role of women at some 
points.  Two years later she addressed the question of women much more fully and 
directly in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), and this was followed by 
several similar pamphlets by women writers, including Mary Hays’ An Appeal to the 
Men of Great Britain (1798), Mary Robinson’s Letter to the Women of England (1799) 
and Mary Anne Radcliffe’s The Female Advocate (1799).   
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 A central aim for all of these writers was to extend the political discussion of innate 
‘rights’ so that it included women.  Wollstonecraft, for example, argues explicitly: ‘[i]f 
the abstract rights of man will bear discussion and explanation, those of woman, by a 
parity of reason, will not shrink from the same test’ (1792: viii) while Robinson asks: ‘is 
not woman a human being, gifted with all the feelings that inhabit the bosom of man?’ 
(1799: 8).  These women were, however, writing at a time when it was truly 
revolutionary to suggest that women deserved equal political consideration with men, 
and they faced considerable difficulties in presenting their arguments effectively.  At the 
end of her pamphlet, Hays draws the reader’s attention to one of these difficulties, 
articulating considerable anxiety about her use of pronouns: 
 
Writing in the first person then, is a practice condemned by the canons of 
criticism, and the use of it forbidden, where it can be at all avoided.  To confound 
the persons is likewise a deadly sin, in the eyes of orthodox critics – Yet against 
both these rules has the writer of this little sketch, transgressed, in no common 
degree. 
In short, it must be confessed, that, ‘the monosyllable’ alleged to be ‘dear to 
authors’ – that the proscribed little personage – I – unfortunately occurs, 
remarkably often, in the foregoing pages.  And that WE – and all its lawful 
accompaniments, which were introduced sometimes, from a desire to take off from 
the dictatorial tone of composition; and sometimes, as expressive of the sense of 
the whole sex, as well as that of the author – are fully as liable to the charge of 
presumption, as even that, for which they were only meant as humble substitutes. 
(1798: 298, Hays’ italics) 
 
Hays’ vocabulary is suggestive of Eve and the Biblical Fall: she has ‘transgressed’ in 
using the first person singular and plural pronouns, because these are ‘forbidden’, ‘a 
deadly sin’ and ‘liable to the charge of presumption’.  She explicitly adds a few 
sentences later that accusations of presumption are particularly likely ‘when the little 
urchin is of the feminine gender’ (1798: 299).   
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 In this article I argue that Hays is here wrestling with the fact that during the political 
debates of the 1790s, even apparently gender-neutral pronouns such as I, you, and we 
carried unspoken assumptions of default masculinity.  This presented a challenge to all 
of the four writers I discuss.  I start by exploring the historical context of political 
writing in the 1790s, and relate it to recent discussions about texts, pronouns and 
gender.  I then outline the background of each text and author.  I use the computer 
textual analysis programme Wordsmith to identify all instances of first and second 
person pronouns in these texts, and discuss the results both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  In conclusion I argue that the patterns of personal pronoun usage in at 
least three of these texts attempt to reformulate the category of ‘human being’ in subtle 
but significant ways. 
 
 Some previous work has been undertaken on Wollstonecraft’s use of personal 
pronouns. Smith (1992), for example, explores the ways in which Wollstonecraft 
addresses her audience, and concludes that Wollstonecraft’s text ‘implies both male and 
female readers’ although Wollstonecraft allots them different roles (568).  Mulholland 
(1995) examines the varying ways in which Wollstonecraft uses authorial I, and finds 
that she mixes tentativeness with strong assertiveness, concluding that this ‘could leave 
her readers with an extremely engaged response’ (185).  Both of these articles are very 
useful, but both focus only on a single aspect of Wollstonecraft’s interpersonal rhetoric.  
MacDonald (2001) addresses Wollstonecraft’s use of both first person singular and first 
person plural pronouns, but his analysis is methodologically flawed on many levels.
2
  
Furthermore, none of these articles systematically compare Wollstonecraft to any other 
woman writing on women’s rights (although Mulholland and MacDonald do draw some 
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comparisons between Wollstonecraft and Catharine Macaulay).  I believe that analysing 
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman in isolation distorts our understanding of 
Wollstonecraft and her text. By comparing Wollstonecraft to other writers on women’s 
rights from the same decade, I hope to achieve a clearer understanding of the context 
within which she was writing and some of the stylistic choices she made, as well as the 
stylistic choices made by other women writing on women’s rights during the 1790s. 
 
2.  Writers and Readers 
 In their groundbreaking book The Madwoman in the Attic (1984) Gilbert and Gubar 
asked: ‘What does it mean to be a woman writer in a culture whose fundamental 
definitions of literary authority are, as we have seen, both overtly and covertly 
patriarchal? (47-48).  Gilbert and Gubar were referring primarily to nineteenth century 
novels, but their question is equally relevant to political pamphlets of the 1790s.  The 
debate generated by the French Revolution debate opened the space within which the 
rights of woman could be discussed, but this space was problematic for women writers, 
not least because of the widespread assumption that pamphlet writing was a male 
activity.  While much recent work in Romantic studies has focused on the extent to 
which women writers could and did contribute to the public political debates of the 
period, it remains true that the vast majority of pamphlet-writers were male.
3
   When a 
woman published a pamphlet anonymously, reviewers often assumed that the writer was 
male.
 
 In Wollstonecraft’s case, for example, she originally published A Vindication of 
the Rights of Men anonymously.  The Critical Review therefore automatically uses the 
male pronoun throughout its review.  The reviewer does note the mistake in a footnote 
added after the review was completed, but comments impatiently that: ‘if she assumes 
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the disguise of a man, she must not be surprised that she is not treated with the civility 
and respect that she would have received in her own person’ (Critical Review 70, 1790: 
694).  What is particularly interesting here is that the accusation that she assumed ‘the 
disguise of a man’ is not the result of any overt deception on Wollstonecraft’s part.  
Rather it arises because the reviewer apparently feels it to be so natural to assume that a 
writer of political pamphlets is male, that to publish anonymously is to publish as a man.  
The Gentleman’s Magazine goes a step further.  Reviewing the second edition, and 
noting that it has now been attributed to a ‘Mrs. Wolstonecraft’ [sic], the reviewer finds 
the concept of a female pamphleteer so anomalous that he questions whether it was 
written by ‘a real and not a fictitious lady’ (Gentleman’s Magazine 61, 1791: 154).   
 
 The same assumption of default masculinity also often operated with regard to 
pamphlet readers.  The eighteenth century had witnessed a rapid expansion in female 
reading audiences, but women readers tended to be associated with novels and 
magazines.
4
  ‘Difficult’ subjects such as philosophy and politics were generally deemed 
‘unfeminine’ and female education did little to prepare women to engage with these 
kinds of texts.
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  Although widely-disseminated texts such as Burke’s Reflections (1790) 
and Paine’s Rights of Man (1791) did attract new audiences, including some women, 
most pamphleteers assumed that their readers were male.  In Reflections, for example, 
Burke compares the way in which government is transmitted to the way in which 
property is transmitted: ‘we receive, we hold, we transmit, our government and our 
privileges, in the same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our 
lives’ (1790: 48).  This comparison presupposes a male reader: under English law in the 
1790s, female rights to receive, enjoy and transmit property were extremely limited.  As 
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can also be evidenced at numerous other points in the text, the implied reader of 
Reflections is male.  The term ‘implied reader’ originates with Iser (1974) as a way of 
describing the ideal reader that a text constructs.  Iser did not explicitly address the issue 
of gender but a number of others, including Fetterley (1978), Montgomery et al (1992: 
223-231) and Mills (1995: 66-79) have done so.  Fetterley, for example, argues that: 
‘[t]o read the canon of what is currently considered classic American literature is 
perforce to identify as male’ (1978: xii).  By the same token, reading political pamphlets 
in the 1790s also required that the reader identify as male. 
 
 For the purposes of this article, I am specifically interested in how Wollstonecraft, 
Hays, Robinson and Radcliffe use first and second person pronouns when writing in a 
cultural context which assumes both writer and reader to be male.  The central role that 
personal pronouns play in constructing and expressing social identities and relationships 
has been well recognised, particularly within fields such as discourse analysis, 
sociolinguistics, critical discourse analysis and feminist language studies.
6
  As 
Benveniste (1971) discusses, these pronouns function rather differently from nominal 
signs: 
What then is the reality to which I or you refers?  It is solely a ‘reality of 
discourse,’ and this is a very strange thing.  I cannot be defined except in terms of 
‘locution,’ not in terms of objects as a nominal sign is.  I signifies “the person who 
is uttering the present instance of discourse containing I.” (1971: 218) 
 
In face-to-face conversations, the ‘reality of discourse’ that is constructed by these 
pronouns will (normally) be clear in the context of the utterance, and the gender of the 
referents will (normally) be apparent.  In written texts, however, the writer may be 
separated from the reader by both time and space.  Wales (1996) analyses this situation: 
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... once objects or third parties are out of sight, their existence is 
presupposed not physically but mentally, in the mental lexicons or 
encyclopedic knowledge of the conversational participants, to be invoked 
and ‘pointed to’ in the universe of discourse held between them.  This is 
even more obvious in the ‘displaced’ medium of writing. 
There are thus three main relevant ‘worlds’ to consider: the real world, its 
mental representation, and its re-creation in the universe of discourse; and 
pronouns can be economically used to refer to all three.  Halliday and Hasan 
themselves therefore usefully distinguish between ‘specific’ exophoric 
reference, the immediate situational, and ‘generalised’ or homophoric, 
referring to the larger cultural context or presupposed knowledge. (1996: 44) 
 
 
In the case of eighteenth-century pamphlet writing, the ‘larger cultural context’ was one 
of default masculinity.  Hence, when an anonymous writer used the pronoun I, 
reviewers, relying upon their presupposed knowledge of the world, tended to assume 
that the ‘real world’ author must be male (and were disconcerted to find that she was 
not).  In the same way, when Burke wrote Reflections on the Revolution in France, he 
presupposed a male reader, accustomed to possessing the same property rights as him.   
 
 Underlying the whole of the French Revolution pamphlet debate, then, is the 
assumption that both the participants in, and the subjects of, it are male.  This means 
that when women attempt to articulate their own political concerns they face distinct 
difficulties in formulating a coherent rhetorical position.  While a male contributor to 
the debate about the rights of man can straightforwardly write as a man to other men on 
behalf of male interests, a female writer attempting to broaden the issue out to include 
the rights of woman can make no such easy assumptions.  Who is she writing to, as, or 
on behalf of?  Is she writing to women to encourage them to throw off their shackles, or 
is she appealing to men to grant women more freedom?  Is she writing as a woman who 
has personally experienced the inequalities she describes, or as an impartial spectator 
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(by default a male role) in order to describe objectively the relationship between the 
sexes as it currently exists?  Is she writing on behalf of women, in order to improve their 
position in society, or is her argument that improving women’s position will work to the 
benefit of men?  Each of these decisions, as I shall show, has ramifications in terms of 
the writer’s deployment of personal pronouns, which in turn has important implications 
for the ‘reality of discourse’ that she constructs within her text. 
 
3.  Texts and Authors 
 In this section I will briefly explore the background and content of each of the four 
texts, focusing in particular on the way in which the private life of the writer interacted 
with the public life of her text.  Mary Wollstonecraft, as has already been noted, 
initiated this new sub-genre of political pamphlet with A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman in 1792.  In it, she combines aspects of a political pamphlet with aspects of an 
educational treatise; a keystone of her argument being that if women were better 
educated they would be much better qualified for their roles as wives and mothers.  As 
such, she is clearly influenced by earlier writers, most notably Catharine Macaulay, who 
in Letters on Education (1790) argues that there are no innate intellectual differences 
between the sexes, and that men and women should therefore receive the same 
education.  Wollstonecraft goes further than Macaulay and makes her argument more 
explicitly political, demanding that society should treat women as rational beings, and 
berating both men and women for the current status of women.  On publication 
Wollstonecraft’s text was positively received in radical circles, but, unsurprisingly, 
provoked either patronising humour or outright hostility in more conservative circles.
7
 
This negative response became much more pronounced after the publication of 
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Godwin's tender but revealing Memoirs (1798), in which he recounts Wollstonecraft’s 
affair with Gilbert Imlay, her subsequent suicide attempts, and her pre-marital affair 
with himself.  These revelations were seized upon by publications such as the anti-
Jacobin British Critic, whose reviewer was quick to link Wollstonecraft’s political 
views to her immoral life, finding that: ‘[i]n the narrative before us, we have an 
opportunity of contemplating the effects of such theories on their own practice.’(British 
Critic 11, 1798: 228)   
 
 Despite such attacks, Wollstonecraft’s influence can clearly be seen on the pamphlet 
writers who come after her, and each of the writers I discuss here specifically positions 
their own text in relation to hers.   Of the three other writers I focus on in this article, 
Mary Hays’ acknowledgement of Wollstonecraft is the most begrudging.  This is on the 
surface surprising given that Hays was a personal friend of both Wollstonecraft and her 
husband William Godwin, and that she published a moving tribute to Wollstonecraft 
after her death in 1797.  In the ‘Advertisement’ to her 1798 Appeal to the Men of Great 
Britain, however, Hays represents Wollstonecraft more as a competitor than an 
inspiration, stating that she herself was already far advanced in writing her own treatise 
when she was sent a copy of Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman.  
Hays justifies her delayed decision to publish anyway by covertly criticising 
Wollstonecraft for being too extreme, and stating that her own pamphlet will 
recommend a much more palatable ‘gradual reformation’ of society (1798: 
‘Advertisement’).  Hays’ surprisingly ambivalent attitude to Wollstonecraft in the 
‘Advertisement’ can perhaps be explained by the fact that the ‘Advertisement’ as a 
whole is a work of fiction.  Hays published her Appeal anonymously (although she does 
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specify that she is a woman), and in so doing she invents an alternative persona for 
herself.  The writer who appears in the ‘Advertisement’ resides in ‘some obscure corner 
of the kingdom’, does not wish any of her friends to know of her writing activities, and 
despairs of successfully publishing her work as she is not acquainted with any 
publishers (‘those formidable gentlemen’) (1798: ‘Advertisement’).  Given that Hays 
lived in London, that she was an integral part of the publisher Joseph Johnson’s circle of 
writers and critics, and that her writings had been appearing in print since 1791, it is 
evident that none of the ‘Advertisement’ can be taken at face value.  Instead it might be 
interpreted as a response to the hostility directed towards Wollstonecraft.  Hays may 
well have felt that own pamphlet would receive a fairer hearing if it were thought to 
originate from a timid ‘country mouse’, rather a well-known associate of 
Wollstonecraft.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the timid country mouse with the 
programme of ‘gradual reformation’ is not in evidence for long in the Appeal.  In the 
first chapter Hays engages energetically with the question of scriptural authority for 
women’s subjugation, concluding that there is none, and by the fifth chapter she is 
declaring that, with regard to male superiority, ‘I must be permitted to say, that men 
upon this subject, are deplorably weak and childish’ (1798: 113).  Only at the very end 
of her pamphlet does the country mouse reappear: the passage quoted earlier in which 
Hays expresses remorse for her pronouns marks a brief return of the earlier apologetic 
persona. 
 
 Mary Robinson, publishing her Letter to the Women of England a year later, also 
knew that her public persona might make her pamphlet unpalatable.  Robinson was 
infamous for her early career as an actress and her affairs with a series of public men, 
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beginning spectacularly with the Prince of Wales.  Abandoned by the Prince and 
paralysed as a result of rheumatism, a miscarriage or a botched abortion (depending on 
whose version of events one chooses to believe), Robinson turned to writing as a means 
to support herself and her daughter.  By the late 1790s she was a successful poet and 
novelist, and was acquainted with many of the leading literary figures of the day, 
including Godwin and Coleridge.  It must have been evident, however, that if published 
under her own name, her pamphlet on women’s subordination would provide critics 
with a golden opportunity to exercise their wit and venom.  Instead, Robinson published 
under the name of ‘Anne Frances Randall’, thereby crediting her text to a completely 
unknown and untainted author.  Within the text she seeks to demonstrate that women 
are the intellectual equals of men by providing a genealogy of learned and distinguished 
women, and she also discusses at length the sexual double standards of society, 
something of which she had had plenty of first-hand experience, although she does not 
say so explicitly.  She makes clear her debt to Wollstonecraft, describing her as ‘an 
illustrious British female, (whose death has not been sufficiently lamented, but to whose 
genius posterity will render justice)’ (1799: 1-2). 
 
 Mary Anne Radcliffe felt able to publish her pamphlet under her own name, perhaps 
because no pre-existing negative associations attached themselves to her, and perhaps 
because she felt that her own pamphlet, making few claims for women’s equality, would 
be less of a target to hostile critics.   Radcliffe had been born into a considerable 
inheritance, but clandestinely married a feckless husband who squandered her wealth.  
She ended up trying to support herself and her children by finding employment in 
London, where she quickly became aware of the limited opportunities available to 
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women such as herself.  This is the central topic of The Female Advocate (1799).  
Radcliffe describes the scarcity of options for a well-born female in need of money, and 
chiefly finds male milliners, stay-makers and haberdashers responsible, on the basis that 
they have usurped properly feminine occupations.  In many ways, Radcliffe’s text is 
much less revolutionary than the other three texts discussed here.  Rather than 
demanding a wholesale reform of education, manners, and society, the main plank of 
Radcliffe’s reforming programme is that male milliners, stay-makers and haberdashers 
should gracefully retire from their fields of business.  However, her analysis of the ways 
in which financial hardship forces women into the prostitution for which society then 
condemns them is remarkably insightful and, in its own way, deeply radical.  
Nevertheless, she is careful to specify that her goals are not as ambitious of those of 
Wollstonecraft, and she repeatedly describes herself as seeking only the right of 
‘protection’ for women (1799: x).  She also presents herself as having been forced into 
writing by the oppression she describes, declaring that: ‘All women possess not the 
Amazonian spirit of a Wolstonecraft [sic].  But, indeed, unremitted oppression is 
sometimes a sufficient apology for their throwing off the gentle garb of a female, and 
assuming some more masculine appearance’ (1799: xi).  This metaphor of ‘masculine 
appearance’ brings us back to the central argument of this article.  Radcliffe evidently 
expects her readers to feel, like she does, that writing a political pamphlet as a woman is 
an act of literary cross-dressing that requires explanation and apology. 
 
4.  Analysis 
 In order to get a broad overview of each writer’s pattern of pronoun usage, I used the 
textual analysis programme Wordsmith to identify all instances of each pronoun.
8
 In 
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doing so I excluded all quotations and direct speech.  The personal pronouns in these 
cases do not construct the relationship between reader and writer in the same way that 
pronouns in the main body of the text do, although they can be very revealing, and I 
shall have occasion to refer to them during my discussion.  However, to include them in 
with the author’s own use of personal pronouns is to distort the picture by counting two 
very different things together.   On the same basis I also excluded any other textual 
material which was not part of the main pamphlet: hence, for example, I excluded 
Wollstonecraft’s prefatory letter to Talleyrand-Périgord, and Radcliffe’s concluding 
‘Story of Fidelia’.  This left 78,019 words for Wollstonecraft, 51,569 for Hays, 10,749 
for Robinson and 20,364 for Radcliffe.  I have provided the statistics for the pronouns in 
two ways in the tables: first, the average (mean) number of pronouns per one thousand 
words in bold, and underneath the original total figure in brackets.
9
 These figures are, 
however, only the starting point for my discussion. I have also used Wordsmith’s 
concordancing tool to enable me to examine each instance in context, and I have read 
each text in its entirety several times to try to ensure that I was not missing anything 
obvious about personal pronoun usage. The computer data can be suggestive, but human 
analysis is also required to determine the referents of pronouns and to understand the 
context of each usage. 
  
3.1 First Person Singular 
[Table 1] 
 The most striking aspect of the figures in Table 1 is the small number of first person 
singular pronouns employed by Robinson and Radcliffe, compared to the relatively 
large numbers employed by Hays and Wollstonecraft.  The figures for Hays and 
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Wollstonecraft are also high compared to the two must influential male writers on the 
French Revolution: Edmund Burke uses the first person singular 8.1 times in every 
1,000 words in Reflections on the Revolution in France, while Thomas Paine uses the 
first person singular 5.3 times per 1,000 words in Rights of Man. 
 
 Joan Mulholland, noting Wollstonecraft’s frequent use of authorial I, suggests that it:  
 
… serves to remind readers that the material they are absorbing has a specific, 
personal origin, and that it is not to be smoothly merged with their own thinking, 
as it comes from another’s mind.  It marks the author’s difference, and hence that 
her ideas may be unusual, with the implication that they be cautiously assessed 
before acceptance. (1995: 177) 
 
Precisely this kind of effect can, I think, be seen in the following passages in which 
Wollstonecraft’s and Hays’ use of I are particularly marked:  
 
Let it not be concluded that I wish to invert the order of things; I have already 
granted, that, from the constitution of their bodies, men seem to be designed by 
Providence to attain a greater degree of virtue. I speak collectively of the whole 
sex; but I see not the shadow of a reason to conclude that their virtues should 
differ in respect to their nature. In fact, how can they, if virtue has only one eternal 
standard? I must therefore, if I reason consequentially, as strenuously maintain 
that they have the same simple direction, as that there is a God.  (Wollstonecraft, 
1792, 49, my bold) 
 
 
I must here for brevity’s sake, adopt the same mode of appeal as upon a former 
occasion, and instead of bringing forward examples to prove what I have 
advanced, trust to the candor of my readers, and ask them; if every law, and 
maxim generally understood as in favor of women; – and maxims advanced at 
random by the men with regard to them, are nearly as rigorous as laws; – does not 
confirm in the strongest manner possible, every word I have said? (Hays, 1798, 
99-100, my bold) 
 
 16 
In Wollstonecraft’s case the frequent use of first person singular pronoun gives this 
argument a very personal perspective: it is the writing I who ‘see[s] not the shadow of a 
reason to conclude’, and who feels forced to ‘strenuously maintain that they have the 
same simple direction’.  Similarly in the extract from Hays the first person singular 
pronouns serve continually to remind the reader of the role of the author in constructing 
the foregoing argument, as she refers to ‘what I have advanced’ and ‘every word I have 
said’.  Both passages give the impression of the author actively engaging with her 
readers in order to guide them through her own thought processes.  On the one hand, 
this can be seen to encourage readers to involve themselves directly in the debate.  On 
the other hand, however, it also creates space for disagreement.  Readers who do not 
share Wollstonecraft’s perspective may feel that that there is a reason to conclude that 
women’s virtues are different or that Wollstonecraft is not reasoning consequentially.   
Readers candidly considering the laws and maxims that favour of women, as Hays 
invites, may find that in their own opinion her argument is not thereby confirmed.  Hays, 
in the passage quoted in the Introduction, worries that the frequent use of the first person 
singular is a sign of vanity (it is ‘“dear to authors”’).  Certainly it serves as a frequent 
reminder of the textual presence of the writer. 
 
 By contrast, Robinson and Radcliffe both tend to state their arguments without this 
element of personal engagement.  To give just one example from Robinson: 
 
In what is woman inferior to man? In some instances, but not always, in corporeal 
strength: in activity of mind, she is his equal. Then, by this rule, if she is to endure 
oppression in proportion as she is deficient in muscular power, only, through all 
the stages of animation the weaker should give precedence to the stronger. Yet we 
should find a Lord of the Creation with a puny frame, reluctant to confess the 
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superiority of a lusty peasant girl, whom nature had endowed with that bodily 
strength of which luxury had bereaved him. (1799: 17) 
 
In Robinson’s passage, each step of the argument is presented not as a matter of 
personal deduction, but as a matter of impersonal fact or shared experience.  Robinson 
makes the reader less directly aware of her thought processes, and the argument is not as 
closely tied to her textual presence.  This perhaps leaves the reader less directly engaged 
with her line of reasoning, but at the same time it also leaves less space for the reader to 
disagree with her. 
 
 Moreover, it must be remembered that in these texts each instance of authorial I not 
only ‘marks the author’s difference’ in the sense of reminding readers that they are 
engaging with another person’s ideas, but also ‘marks the author’s difference’ by 
reminding them that they are engaging with a woman’s ideas.  Hays’ and 
Wollstonecraft’s repeated use of I guides the reader through their thought processes, and 
in doing so guides the reader through the workings of their female minds, demonstrating 
as well as explicitly arguing that woman is capable of rational thought.  This is, of 
course, a double-edged strategy.  On the one hand, a reader who is convinced by their 
arguments will find the proof in both the medium and the message: woman must be 
capable of rational thought because the female author is thinking rationally.  On the 
other hand, a reader who is not persuaded by their arguments will find the same 
evidence: the flawed reasoning of the author provides yet more evidence of women’s 
inferior mental capacity.  Indeed, one hostile reviewer makes this connection very 
explicitly in the case of Wollstonecraft, writing that ‘if miss [sic] Wollstonecraft had 
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wished to give a practical instance of the inferiority of the female mind, she has 
completely effected it’ (Critical Review 5, 1792: 133).   
 
 
3.2 First Person Plural 
[Table 2] 
 Although Table 2 is suggestive, it disguises the fact that in English, the pronoun we 
can refer to two different groupings of people.  Wales (1996) describes these referents as 
follows: 
 
As in many other languages, we can refer ‘inclusively’ to speaker and 
addressee(s) ..., so that the speaker presumes to speak on the addressee’s 
behalf; or it can refer ‘exclusively’ to speaker and third party or parties, who 
may or may not be present in the immediate situation ... (1996: 58) 
 
As women writing on the subject of women’s rights, these authors could employ either 
an inclusive we, referring to the writer plus her readers, be they male or female, or an 
exclusive we, referring to the writer and all other women, but specifically excluding 
male readers.
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 Radcliffe and Robinson are both quite consistent in their use of the first person plural 
pronoun.  For Radcliffe, we never excludes male readers, and always assumes a shared 
set of values, namely that both the author and reader are British, Christian, and 
sympathetic towards the suffering of others, particularly when those others are 
impoverished middle-class females: 
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Good God!  is it possible we can see our fellow creatures debased so low! Can we 
see the tender and delicate frame, which was formerly accustomed to ease and 
tranquillity, and which was formed by nature to participate in others misfortunes!  
can we let these innocent and helpless beings pass unnoticed, and not commiserate 
their distress, and ask, from whence the cause? (1799: 36-37)
  
Robinson similarly sticks predominantly to a single usage, again including reader and 
writer together in a shared set of values, although in her case we tends to be rather more 
analytical and rather less sympathetic: 
We know that women, like princes, are strangers to the admonitions of truth; and 
yet we are astonished when we behold them emulous of displaying every thing 
puerile and unessential; and aiming perpetually at arbitrary power … (1799: 11) 
 
This, use, which I will refer to as a we rational beings use, does not distinguish between 
rational beings on the basis of their gender, although given the gender politics of the day 
this was by default a male category.  As such, these writers are implicitly making claims 
about the right of women to be considered as rational beings, by including themselves in 
such a grouping.  Nevertheless, they are only doing so on an individual and one-off 
basis.  A central argument for Robinson is that the majority of women are currently 
unfitted to engage in rational discourse on account of their inadequate education, while 
Radcliffe, as I have already noted, describes herself as temporarily adopting ‘a 
masculine appearance’ in writing her pamphlet.  Both women avoid using any 
exclusively female first person plural pronouns, and both maintain a detached position 
when describing the sufferings of women, despite their own personal experiences of 
precisely the kinds of suffering they describe.  Strikingly, the only instance in 
Robinson’s text where she does use we to refer exclusively to women is on the title 
page, which carries a quotation from the heroine of a play by Nicholas Rowe (as a 
quotation, I have omitted this from my results): ‘Wherefore are we /Born with high 
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Souls, but to assert ourselves?’ (my bold).  Robinson is thus only willing to employ an 
exclusively female first person plural pronoun in a quotation where the originator is 
marked as male.  This suggests that Robinson actively avoids aligning herself with 
women in general.  
 
 Both Hays and Wollstonecraft also employ the inclusive we rational beings, and 
speak of women (as well as men, on occasion) in the third person: 
 
Upon the same principles we cannot help doubting much, whether because the 
minds of women are more pliable, and yield more readily to the pressure of 
circumstances, without altogether sinking under them; that we are thereby entitled 
to brand them with weakness or levity. (Hays, 1798: 43, my bold) 
 
In treating, therefore, of the manners of women, let us, disregarding sensual 
arguments, trace what we should endeavour to make them in order to co-operate, 
if the expression be not too bold, with the Supreme Being.  (Wollstonecraft, 1792: 
36, my bold) 
 
In both passages there is a clear distinction between we rational beings who are 
examining women’s situation, and they women who are being examined.   Unlike 
Robinson and Radcliffe, however, both Wollstonecraft and Hays also at times write very 
explicitly as women, and they both employ exclusively female first person plural 
pronouns in order to do so.  Hays for example writes: 
 
But we relinquish willingly this kind of preference which you force upon us, and 
which we have no title to; and which indeed is an intolerable burthen in the way 
you contrive to administer it; and instead of this, we only entreat of you to be fair, 
to be candid, and to admit, that both sexes are upon a footing of equality, when 
they are permitted to exert in their different spheres of action, the talents their 
Creator has been pleased to bestow upon them. (1798: 61-62, my bold) 
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Each of these first person plural pronouns refers exclusively to women, and men have 
been cast into the role of you.  Wollstonecraft similarly groups herself with women 
through her use of the first person plural: 
 
Thus Milton describes our first frail mother; though when he tells us that women 
are formed for softness and sweet attractive grace, I cannot comprehend his 
meaning, unless, in the true Mahometan strain, he meant to deprive us of souls, 
and insinuate that we were beings only designed by sweet attractive grace, and 
docile blind obedience, to gratify the senses of man when he can no longer soar on 
the wing of contemplation. (1792: 33, my bold)  
 
Evidently ‘our first frail mother’ and ‘tells us’ have the potential to be inclusive of the 
whole human race, but by the time Wollstonecraft writes ‘he meant to deprive us’, only 
women are included.  Indeed, it is particularly noticeable that Wollstonecraft’s 
transitions from we rational beings to we women are often abrupt and unannounced.  To 
give another example: 
 
It is time to effect a revolution in female manners – time to restore them to their 
lost dignity – and make them, as a part of the human species, labour by 
reforming themselves to reform the world.  It is time to separate unchangeable 
morals from local manners.  –  If men be demi-gods – why let us serve them!  
And if the dignity of the female soul be as disputable as that of animals – if their 
reason does not afford sufficient light to direct their conduct whilst unerring 
instinct is denied – they are surely of all creatures the most miserable! (1792: 92-
93, my bold) 
 
Wollstonecraft begins by declaring the need to make women reform themselves, but 
suddenly, as if exasperated, breaks into an exclamation in which the us is inclusive of 
herself and all women, and explicitly exclusive of men.  Smith (1992) has suggested that 
Wollstonecraft deliberately distances herself from women’s follies through her selective 
deployment of we women: ‘she often does so to show herself the mutual victim of an 
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insult without being a companion in folly’ and ‘generally excludes herself from 
statements that demonstrate feminine follies and weaknesses’ (560).  This argument, I 
think, implies that Wollstonecraft could have written more consistently as we women if 
she had chosen to do so, and that her decision not to requires explanation.  However, my 
survey of these writers suggest that none wrote comfortably and consistently as we 
women, and that it is the few instances when they did feel able to do so that needs to be 
accounted for.  Offering a modification of Smith’s argument, I would therefore suggest 
that Hays and Wollstonecraft’s textual performance of indignation enables them to 
abandon their role as writing on behalf of we rational beings in order to temporarily 
write as we women.  
 
 In both Hays’ and Wollstonecraft’s pamphlets, the we women exclusive pronoun is 
comparatively rare.  In Wollstonecraft’s Vindication only 41 out of the total 286 first 
person plural pronouns (14%) refer clearly and unambiguously to we women; in Hays’ 
Appeal only 29 out of the total 352 first person plural pronouns (8%) do so.  
Nevertheless, I would suggest that the sudden shifts that both writers make between 
talking of we rational beings to talking of we women are potentially very disruptive.  A 
male reader, accustomed to find himself squarely positioned as the implied reader of a 
political pamphlet, periodically finds himself ejected from that privileged position.  A 
female reader, meanwhile, accustomed to occupy a more marginal textual position, 
suddenly finds herself explicitly addressed by the author.   
 
3.3 Second Person Pronoun 
[Table 3] 
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 In Table 3 it is Radcliffe’s very limited use of second person pronouns that most 
immediately stands out.  Closer inspection reveals that this is because Radcliffe very 
rarely addresses her reader directly.   All four of the instances of you recorded above, 
appear in the formulaic phrase ‘if you please,’ (for example, ‘Let us then, if you please, 
select one of these distressed females’ (1799: 29).)  These are instances of ‘impersonal’ 
you, in which Radcliffe appeals to people in general, rather than to any group of people 
in particular.
11
  The single instances of thou / thee / thy / thyself, which all occur within 
the same two sentences, address an imagined orphaned child (‘Pitiable object! thy fate 
seems hard indeed’ (1799: 78).  Only the two occurrences of ye and the single 
occurrence of yourselves really speak to the reader directly:   
 
But ye of the world, whose understandings have so long been carried down 
the stream of misrepresentation, suffer not yourselves to be any longer led 
away by false and mistaken prejudice […] (1799: 63, my bold) 
   
But whose conduct of the four, think ye, was the most commendable, or 
pleasing in the sight of God or man? (1799: 116, my bold) 
 
On both of these occasions, Radcliffe is using an religious register, signalled by her use 
of imperatives, archaic syntax (‘suffer not yourselves’ for ‘do not suffer yourselves’, and 
‘think ye’ for ‘do you think’), and the archaic form ye.12  In most of her pamphlet, 
Radcliffe seems reluctant to directly engage with her readership, but here her use of 
religious language seems to enable her to address her readers, although without any 
reference to their gender. 
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 Hays shows a much more frequent use of second person pronouns.  4 (3 you, 1 ye) 
are indefinite in reference.  10 appear in a single passage that apostrophises an imagined 
woman who devotes all her time to beauty:  
For oh! what patience and industry, what time and trouble, what acute 
observation, what intense thought, what ceaseless anxiety, what hopes and 
fears, alternately elate and depress thy trembling spirit, thou busy priestess 
of vanity! The half of the talents, the perseverance, the resolution and 
attention, hadst thou been but a man; might have placed thee on the 
woolstack, or have put a mitre on thy head, or a long robe on thy back, or a 
truncheon in thy hand. Or, being even what thou art, the fiftieth part of thy 
misemployed talents if turned into proper channels, might have made thee 
what is tantamount, to a Chancellor, a Bishop, a Judge, or a General – An 
useful, an amiable, and an interesting woman. (1798: 79) 
 
As with Radcliffe’s use of ye, the use of archaic pronouns here appears to invoke a 
religious register: the addressee is ‘thou busy priestess of vanity’.  Indeed, Hays also 
uses 7 instances of thou / thee / thy to address God directly.  The remaining 2 instances 
of the archaic second person singular pronoun are used to chastise the ‘pampered race’ 
of wealthy families (1798: 244).   Every other second person pronoun (11 ye, 47 you, 
and 15 your) address male readers specifically.  For example, she writes: ‘to you fathers, 
brothers, husbands, sons, and lovers, I submit the following pages’ (1798: iii, my bold), 
‘They are indeed directed to you, oh man!’ (1798: 28, my bold) and ‘Ah! ye abetters of 
hypocrisy! ye self-imposers! ye slaves to surface!’ (1798: 123, my bold). Hays’ direct 
and repeated address to men is perhaps to be expected given that the title of her 
pamphlet is Appeal to the Men of Great Britain: her text is explicitly aimed at male 
rather than female readers. 
 
 By contrast, Robinson’s second person pronouns are unexpected given that her title is 
Letter to the Women of England.  Despite this title, she does not begin by addressing her 
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readership as ‘My Dear Countrywomen’, and indeed she describes her intention as being 
to: ‘remind my enlightened country-women that they are not the mere appendages of 
domestic life’ (1799: 3, my bold).  Thus from the beginning, women are referred to in 
the third person, spoken of, rather than spoken to.   Furthermore, Robinson also twice 
addresses men directly, using a total of 7 second person pronouns:  
 
Read this, ye English fathers and husbands, and retract your erroneous 
opinions, respecting female education. (1799: foonote, 41, my bold) 
 
Sensual Egotists! woman is absolutely necessary to your felicity; nay, even 
to your existence: yet she must not arrogate to herself the power to interest 
your actions. You idolize her personal attractions, as long as they influence 
your senses; when they begin to pall, the magick is dissolved; and prejudice 
is ever eager to condemn what passion has degraded. (1799: 85, my bold) 
 
These passages suggest that, despite the title of her pamphlet, she is conscious of her 
potential male readership.  In fact there is just one paragraph in which Robinson directly 
addresses women and this occurs towards the very end of her text and contains 9 second 
person pronouns: 
O! my unenlightened country-women! read, and profit, by the admonition of 
Reason. Shake off the trifling, glittering shackles, which debase you. Resist those 
fascinating spells which, like the petrifying torpedo, fasten on your mental 
faculties. Be less the slaves of vanity, and more the converts of Reflection. Nature 
has endowed you with personal attractions: she has also given you the mind 
capable of expansion. Seek not the visionary triumph of universal conquest; know 
yourselves equal to greater, nobler, acquirements: and by prudence, temperance, 
firmness, and reflection, subdue that prejudice which has, for ages past, been your 
inveterate enemy. Let your daughters be liberally, classically, philosophically, and 
usefully educated; let them speak and write their opinions freely; let them read and 
think like rational creatures; adapt their studies to their strength of intellect; 
expand their minds, and purify their hearts, by teaching them to feel their mental 
equality with their imperious rulers. By such laudable exertions, you will excite 
the noblest emulation; you will explode the superstitious tenets of bigotry and 
fanaticism; confirm the intuitive immortality of the soul, and give them that 
genuine glow of conscious virtue which will grace them to posterity.  
 (Robinson, 1799: 93, my bold) 
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The emotional heat has been turned up, and Robinson engages directly with women for 
the first time, in order to urge them to take responsibility for their own lives.  Yet again 
a religious register is in evidence, even if the old-fashioned ye is not employed.   
Robinson exhorts her female readers to seek self improvement with a series of 
imperatives, archaic syntax (‘seek not’ rather than ‘do not seek’) and modals that 
promise triumph (‘you will excite the noblest emulation; you will explode the 
superstitious tenets of bigotry and fanaticism’).  The remaining 1 second person pronoun 
is indefinite in reference. 
 
 Wollstonecraft uses the archaic second person singular pronoun thou / thee/ thy / 
thyself to address a wide range of interlocutors: God (6), virtue (4), modesty (3), 
Rousseau (1), religion (1), and her reader (1).  She apostrophises an imagined fallen 
woman in a lengthy paragraph using 13 of these pronouns (1792: 284-5).  ‘Hapless 
woman’ is also addressed at length: 
Hapless woman! what can be expected from thee when the beings on whom 
thou art said naturally to depend for reason and support, have all an interest 
in deceiving thee! This is the root of the evil that has shed a corroding 
mildew on all thy virtues; and blighting in the bud thy opening faculties, 
has rendered thee the weak thing thou art! It is this separate interest - this 
insidious state of warfare, that undermines morality, and divides mankind! 
(1792: 216, my bold) 
 
Here Wollstonecraft addresses ‘woman’ and uses the singular form of the pronoun, but 
appears to be doing so in order to address the female race as a whole, a usage which is 
not to be found in any of the other three authors.  Of the 60 second person pronouns 
taking the form ye/you, 28 are indefinite in reference.  She writes, for example: ‘[i]f you 
mean to secure ease and prosperity on earth as the first consideration, and leave futurity 
to provide for itself; you act prudently in giving your child an early insight into the 
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weaknesses of his nature’ (1792: 245, my bold).  She also, however, uses you to speak 
directly to her female readers at two points, accounting for 28 of her second person 
pronouns.  At the end of Chapter 7 she writes: 
Would ye, O my sisters, really possess modesty, ye must remember that the 
possession of virtue, of any denomination, is incompatible with ignorance 
and vanity! ye must acquire that soberness of mind, which the exercise of 
duties, and the pursuit of knowledge, alone inspire, or ye will still remain in 
a doubtful dependent situation, and only be loved whilst ye are fair! The 
downcast eye, the rosy blush, the retiring grace, are all proper in their 
season; but modesty, being the child of reason, cannot long exist with the 
sensibility that is not tempered by reflection. Besides, when love, even 
innocent love, is the whole employ of your lives, your hearts will be too 
soft to afford modesty that tranquil retreat, where she delights to dwell, in 
close union with humanity. (1792: 296-7, my bold) 
 
This religious register becomes even more marked in the final chapter when she again 
addresses women.  This time the passage takes the form of a catechism for women who 
consult mediums: 
I must be allowed to expostulate seriously with the ladies who follow these 
idle inventions; for ladies, mistresses of families, are not ashamed to drive in 
their own carriages to the door of the cunning man. And if any of them 
should peruse this work, I entreat them to answer to their own hearts the 
following questions, not forgetting that they are in the presence of God. 
Do you believe that there is but one God, and that he is powerful, wise, and 
good? 
Do you believe that all things were created by him, and that all beings are 
dependent on him? [...] (1792: 415-6, my bold) 
 
In total, Wollstonecraft asks women a series of 7 questions, interspersed with some 
additional commentary.  However, the fact that she initially seeks permission to address 
women explicitly (‘I must be allowed to expostulate’) suggests that up until this point 
she anticipates a mixed audience.  Furthermore, her pamphlet actually concludes with an 
exhortation to men: 
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Be just then, O ye men of understanding! and mark not more severely what 
women do amiss, than the vicious tricks of the horse or the ass for whom ye 
provide provender – and allow her the privileges of ignorance, to whom ye 
deny the rights of reason, or ye will be worse than Egyptian task-masters, 
expecting virtue where nature has not given understanding! (1792: 451-2, 
my bold) 
 
Wollstonecraft’s pamphlet thus closes with an address in which she speaks directly to 
men, explicitly excluding women, who are instead spoken of in the third person. 
 
 Overall then, none of these 4 pamphlets use second person pronouns exclusively to 
address women:  Radcliffe and Hays do not address you women at all, while Robinson 
and Wollstonecraft do address you women, but also address you men.  It is also 
noticeable that writing to you women only seems to be possible when a religious register 
is in use: the writer temporarily adopts the voice of a clergyman, and this enables her to 
harangue her female readers personally.  While this religious register is not limited to 
you women (Radcliffe, for example, uses it to address ‘ye of the world’), there are no 
instances of a non-religious you women.  These patterns are particularly striking given 
that in her pamphlet, Hays addresses you men so frequently, often without any religious 
colouring.  Taken together these pamphlets suggest that it was fairly straightforward for 
a writer to address the men of Great Britain, but much harder for a writer to address 
herself consistently to the women of Great Britain.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
 Of the four authors I have discussed here, Radcliffe does the least to challenge the 
‘larger cultural context’ within which both readers and writers of political pamphlets 
were assumed to be male.  Her sparing use of the first person singular pronoun means 
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that the reader is not insistently reminded of her female textual presence.  Her first 
person plural pronouns never presume a shared community of author and female 
readers.  Her second person pronouns never address her readers on the basis of their 
gender, so male readers are neither marginalised nor personally targeted.  This is 
perhaps because she requires no direct action from her readers, other than a change in 
attitude towards distressed females.  It also perhaps also explains why, despite its 
virulent attack on Wollstonecraft, the British Critic was happy to declare ‘society at 
large may be much benefited by the perusal of the labours of Mrs. Radcliffe’ (British 
Critic 14, 1799: 686).) 
 
 In many ways Robinson’s use of personal pronouns similarly does little to disturb her 
reader’s existing ‘mental image’ of the world.  Like Radcliffe, her use of the first person 
singular pronoun is sparing and she avoids speaking as we women.  However, as I have 
noted she does speak directly to you women in an extended passage at the end of her 
text.  Nevertheless, this is perhaps a rather meagre passage given that her whole text is 
supposedly a letter to the women of England and particularly given that she also twice 
addresses you men.  Overall, I would suggest, Robinson’s pattern of second pronoun 
usage stands as testimony to the difficulty that these writers found in imagining a female 
audience for their texts even when their titles suggests that they set out to write for one. 
 
 Hays, as I noted at the beginning of this article, explicitly reflects upon her use of the 
first person pronoun in the closing section of her pamphlet.  It is noticeable that the 
features she identifies are remarkably similar to those I have discussed in my analysis: a 
frequent use of the first person singular (‘the proscribed little personage’), and a 
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frequent use of the first person plural that shifts between we rational beings (‘to take off 
from the dictatorial tone of composition’) and we women (‘expressive of the sense of the 
whole sex’).  These usages, I have suggested, challenge the existing ‘cultural context’ in 
which both writers and readers of pamphlets were assumed to be male, and construct an 
alternative ‘reality of discourse’ in which women do both read and write political 
pamphlets: her frequent use of the first person singular, and her collective use of we 
women serves repeatedly to remind her reader that that a woman wrote the pamphlet, 
and that she purports to speak on behalf of all women.  She does not address you women 
directly, but this may be accounted for by the fact that her pamphlet is An Appeal to the 
Men of Great Britain.   
 
 Wollstonecraft presents the most complex pattern of personal pronoun usage.  She 
frequently uses the first person singular, and she rapidly switches between using the first 
person plural to speak as we rational beings and we women.  In addition, she (albeit 
rarely) addresses women directly as you women, and also addresses ‘woman’ in the 
abstract as thou.  The male reader of Wollstonecraft’s text is thus repeatedly reminded 
of her female textual presence, and is periodically deposed from his position as the 
implied reader by both you women and we women.  A reader, male or female, cannot 
help recognising that the ‘reality of discourse’ she creates is in her pamphlet is rather 
different from that of most pamphlets. 
 
 Wollstonecraft has nevertheless sometimes been criticised for the fact that she does 
not more consistently address herself to women.  Vlasopolos (1980), for example, has 
written that: ‘[t]o an extent surprising for those of us primed to look upon A Vindication 
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as a feminist manifesto, the book proves to be written for men’ ( 462), and she finds that 
Wollstonecraft’s tone when  she does address women directly ‘is condescending, even 
insulting’ (463).  Poovey (1984) similarly finds that Wollstonecraft: ‘rejects a female 
speaking voice’ and that in her occasional addresses to women ‘both her formal, self-
consciously rhetorical address and her condescension distance her from her natural 
allies’ (79-80).  Other critics have attempted to account for Wollstonecraft’s apparent 
disdain for her female audience.  Gubar (1994), for example, argues that: ‘feminist 
expository prose inevitably embeds itself in the misogynist tradition it seeks to address 
and redress’ (462).  Gubar draws on Bakhtin’s concept of the ‘overpopulation’ of 
language to describe the fact that, in ‘expropriating’ the language of others in order to 
make it serve their own ends, feminist writers such as Wollstonecraft often end up 
reproducing the misogynistic discourses they are attempting to discredit (465).  Finke 
(1992) writes that Wollstonecraft: ‘wants to make an argument for women a public 
agents, but she has no language out of which to construct this role except that of the 
masculine public sphere’ (120).  Also drawing upon Bakhtin, Finke argues that 
Wollstonecraft ‘interweave[s] the languages and genres of public rationality and 
domestic feeling in a dialogue that allows her to create an oppositional stance within 
public-sphere discourse’ (129). 
 
 My own findings suggest that a Bakhtinian approach to these texts is fruitful, 
particularly when coupled with a detailed analysis of personal pronouns, which can alert 
us to the shifting discourses that these writers employ.  Language, Bakhtin (1981) 
writes, is only unitary in the abstract: 
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Actual social life and historical becoming create within an abstractly unitary 
national language, a multitude of concrete worlds, a multitude of bounded 
verbal-ideological and social belief systems; within these various systems 
(identical in the abstract) are elements of language filled with various 
semantic and axiological content and each with its own different sound. 
(1981: 288) 
 
The genre of political pamphlet writing in the 1790s, partly through its pattern of 
personal pronoun usage, encoded the social belief that reading and writing political 
pamphlets was a male activity.  The very act of writing a pamphlet as a woman 
disrupted this belief system: the I of these pamphlets denotes a textual female presence.  
However, these writers also disrupt the social belief system of the political pamphlet by 
incorporating alternative discourses which allowed for alternative patterns of personal 
pronoun usage.  Some of these, as I noted at the beginning of my analysis, I have 
excluded from this study for practical reasons: quotations, letters and embedded stories, 
for example.  But even my limited analysis has identified the presence of some 
alternative discourses, such as Hays’ and Wollstonecraft’s exasperated outbursts in 
which they identify as we women.  Most notable, however, is the way in which these 
writers use the discourse of the pulpit to offer them alternative ways of addressing their 
readers.
13
  In particular, as I have noted, both Wollstonecraft and Robinson use 
archaic/religious discourse to address their audience as you women.  This, I would 
suggest, is perhaps because although the genre of the political pamphlet did not 
habitually recognise its audience as female, the genre of the sermon did. 
 In conclusion, I would argue that my analysis suggests that it was by no means 
straightforward for these writers to write political pamphlets as women, or to anticipate 
women readers for their pamphlets.  Despite this, Robinson, Hays and especially 
Wollstonecraft do succeed in speaking as we women and/or addressing you women for 
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brief passages in their texts.  These passages, despite their fleeting nature, succeed in 
constructing an alternate ‘reality of discourse’ in which women could participate in 
public political discourse. 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
 On the historical semantics of man Baron (1986) notes that: ‘While it is generally agreed that the 
original sense of man in Proto-Germanic or Indo-European was simply 'human being,' by historical times 
the word had developed a masculine meaning that eventually supplanted the primary, unmarked meaning’ 
(137-38).  Writers such as Paine in Rights of Man certainly give no indication that their arguments about 
‘rights of man’ are intended to include women.   The assumption that man equals male can also be seen 
very clearly in the Monthly Review’s broadly positive response to Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman.  The reviewer specifically laments the fact that English lacks a general term to denote 
the species of ‘human being’, commenting that ‘The want of such a general term is a material defect in our 
language.’ (Monthly Review 8, 1792: 209).  This complaint implies, of course, that the reviewer 
understands the term man to be specifically male. 
2
 For example, MacDonald (2001) claims to have discounted all pronouns used within quotations, but 
appears to have left in the quotations themselves when calculating the total word length of the texts, which 
he then uses for calculating the overall comparative frequency of these pronouns (32).  His application of 
linguistic theory is also cavalier.  He quotes from Henley, Miller and Beazley (1995) that the ‘passive 
voice may be used to deprive subordinates of their agency’ (2001: 33).  Ignoring the cautious may in this 
quotation, and the fact that the authors conclude by arguing that ‘[w]e sorely need more psycholinguistic 
study that takes social knowledge and context into account’ (1995: 81), MacDonald uses this quotation to 
licence his creation of what he calls an ‘agency ratio’ for Wollstonecraft’s Vindications, whereby he 
divides the number of first person singular pronouns that are the subject of passive clauses, by the number 
of first person singular pronouns that are the subject of active clauses (33-35). 
3
 Pendleton (1982) lists 340 pamphlets, of which only three of them are obviously by female writers.  
Allowances need to be made for the fact that Pendleton may well have overlooked some pamphlets, some 
of the anonymous pamphlets may have been female-authored, and some of the apparently male authors 
may be pseudonyms for female writers.  Nevertheless, it is evident that male authorship of political 
pamphlets during the 1790s was very much the norm.  For examples of recent scholarship on women's 
contributions to the public sphere during the period, see Mellor (2002) or Cracuin and Lokke (eds.) 
(2002). 
4
 Traditional accounts of eighteenth century reading audiences posit a strong link between women readers 
and novels.  Altick (1957), for example, writes that ‘when Pamela appeared (1740-41) its success and that 
of the novels that followed it revealed the extent of the female audience which for several decades for 
something to read’ (45).  More recently this correlation has been challenged by Fergus (2000) who in a 
study of the records of two Midland booksellers finds that ‘the female audience for fiction was not 
especially large’ (172).  Despite this, popular opinion in 1790s certainly equated female readers with the 
novel.  
5
 Guest (2000) argues that although female learning was celebrated in England in the mid-eighteenth 
century, by the 1770s and 1780s it was becoming increasingly problematic.  She attributes this to a larger 
cultural shift which took place in during these decades, which saw ‘a new emphasis on the values of 
private, domestic, and familial as the basis for public morality’ (159).  In her Appeal Hays attempts to 
discredit a view she finds to be widespread: ‘[t]hat knowledge renders women masculine, and 
consequently disgusting in their manners’ (1798: 172). 
6
 See for example Duszak (2002), Fairclough (2001) and Penelope (1990). 
7
 See Janes (1978) for a good account of the early reception of Wollstonecraft’s Vindication. 
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8
 Wordsmith is a suite of tools for studying texts, including tools for creating concordances, word-lists and 
key-words, etc.  It is designed by Mike Scott of the University of Liverpool.  Full details can be found on 
his web page, http://www.lexically.net.  For this project I have predominantly used the wordlist and 
concordancing functions. 
9
 In an earlier draft of this article I kept the numbers directly comparable by just using the first 10,000 
words from each of the texts.  This proved unsatisfactory, however, as these extracts were not necessarily 
representative of the texts as a whole.    
10
 We can of course also have a number of other meanings.  For a full discussion, see Mühlhäusler and 
Harré (1990: 168-206) and Wales (1996: 64-68). 
11
 For a discussion of ‘impersonal’ you see Wales (1996: 78-84). 
12
 Historically, ye was the subjective case of the second person plural pronoun until the objective case you 
supplanted it in the early modern period.  See Wales (1996: 89) . 
13
 Carpenter (1986) has argued that Wollstonecraft’s Vindication should be read within the tradition of 
prophetic discourse, and that Wollstonecraft used this tradition to disrupt the ‘prisonhouse of language 
and rational discourse’ within which she found herself (227).  Carpenter is primarily interested in 
analysing the way in which Wollstonecraft engages with the Book of Job, but her argument can also be 
applied to the way in which all of these writers engage with the rhetoric of preaching.   
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